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THE OPTION OF PRESERVING A HERITAGE: THE
1987 AMENDMENTS TO THE ALASKA NATIVE
CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT
Ju'iaA. Rowen*
Sometimes people believe a general principle and yet ...
when they're in a tough spot, they might do something be-
cause they just don't have any choice.'
The 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)2
devised a new plan of property settlement for the Native peoples.
The ANCSA provided for both a land and cash settlement to
satisfy the Natives' claims to the land.3 The distribution of the
.settlement, however, was complicated by the requirement that
the Natives establish corporations under Alaska state law.4 It is
these formed corporations that collected the proceeds from the
cash settlement and from the revenues generated by the corpor-
ation's profits.5
The original passage of the ANCSA contained several pro-
tective guidelines and procedures. Specifically, Natives cannot
alienate their stock for a twenty-year period, ending December
18, 1991.6 It is only after this date that the stock can be sold
on the open market.7 The fear of takeovers from outside entities
and loss of Native ownership has increased as the 1991 date
* B.A., 1987, J.D., 1990, Catholic University of America. Associate, Dyer, Ellis,
Joseph & Mills, Washington, D.C.
Second place award, 1988-89 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. T. BERan, VLAGE JouRNEY 106 (1985) (quoting a statement from Eunice
Nesseth at a Klawock village hearing). In 1983, Berger was appointed by the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference to conduct the Alaska Native Review Commission. To this
purpose, Berger visited Native villages in Alaska and collected Natives' ideas and
concerns about the ANCSA.
2. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 668 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§
1601-1641 (1988)).
3. Lazarus, Jr. & West, Jr., The Alaska Claims Settlement Act: A Flawed Victory,
40 LAw & CoNTEmP. Paons. 133 (1976) [hereinafter Lazarus & West]. Native is defined
as a citizen of the United States who is one-fourth degree or more Alaska Indian,
Eskimo or Aleut blood, or a combination thereof. 43 U.S.C. § 1602(b) (1982).
4. Lazarus & West, supra note 3, at 133. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (1982).
5. 43 U.S.C. § 1606 (1982).
6. Id. §§ 1606(h), 1607(c).
7. Id.
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approaches.8 The voicing of these fears by the Natives prompted
Congress to continue the alienability restrictions after December
18, 1991. 9 Nevertheless, the 1987 amendments to the ANCSA
are qualified by the availability of options, within the amend-
ments, that permit termination of the restrictions. 10
For many Natives the sale of their stock is a sale of their
heritage." The stock shares the Natives hold represent their claim
to the land.12 Although the Natives hold shares in the land,
many of them are faced with poverty, and several of the cor-
porations are near bankruptcy.' 3 Because of these financial
plights, the liquidation of their stock may become the only
available means of satisfying debts.'
4
This note will discuss the 1987 amendments to the ANCSA,
which were designed to extend alienation restrictions beyond
1991. First, a brief history of the ANCSA will be detailed.
Second, the amendments will be analyzed with particular focus
on the achievement of land preservation for the Natives, which
is the stated goal for the enactment of the ANCSA. 5 Finally,
reasons will be offered as to why the amendments will not
succeed in achieving the ANCSA's stated goal.
The Aaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971
The passage of the ANCSA in 1971 exposed a new way of
dealing with aboriginal land claims. 16 Traditionally, Indian and
Native land claims reached settlement through negotiations and
treaties, and lands were set aside as reservations. 7 The ANCSA
established a new and systematic course of dealing with the
Natives.'
8
8. H.R. REP. No. 31, 100th Cong., ist Sess., at 5 (1987) [hereinafter H.R. RE.
No. 31].
9. d.
10. Pub. L. No. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788 (1988) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1629b-
1629e (1988)).
11. See T. BERGm, supra note 1, at 98 (quote from Myra Starkloff at a Tyonek
hearing).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 95.
14. Id. at 106.
15. 46 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988); see H.R. RaP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 3.
16. Id.
17. See Comment, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: An Illusion In the
Quest for Native Self-Determination, 66 OR. L. Ray. 195, 197-98 (1987) (authored by
Shannon D. Work).
18. H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 3.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss2/9
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The Alaskan Natives, as aboriginals inhabiting the land, staked
claims to almost all of the state's 375 million acres. 9 Pressure
to settle these claims escalated in 1970 as a result of the discovery
of oil deposits in Alaska. 0 Private industries, seeking the op-
portunity to exploit these resources, joined the Natives in their
attempt to settle the land claims.2' The collective pressures of
these groups persuaded Congress to provide a settlement3n
The Act
In exchange for the extinguishment of the Natives' rights to
the land, the ANCSA provided for a settlement of 44 million
acres to be held in fee by the Natives, and a $462.5 million
payment from the U.S. Treasury over an eleven-year period238
Also, a 2% royalty, subject to a ceiling of $500 million, was to
be added to the cash settlement for mineral development on the
lands transferred to the federal and state government by the
terms of the Act. The ANCSA provided more money and land
for the Natives than any other previous treaty, agreement, or
statute for the dissolution of aboriginal title in the nation's
history.28 Despite the appearance of a generous settlement, in
actuality the amount of compensation to the Natives for the 300
million acres attained by the government averaged about $3 an
acre.26
The fundamental difference between the ANCSA and other
land settlements is the administration of the land and the pay-
ments made to the Natives.27 Past settlements designated reser-
vation sites and held land in trust for the aboriginal peoples; in
contrast, the ANCSA directed that the settlement be channeled
through organized corporations with the Natives as shareholders
in these corporations.38 The greatest distinction between the two
types of settlement arrangements is that the ANCSA gave the
Natives control over their land and assets.29 Hence, removal of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs from supervising the Natives'
19. See Lazarus & West, supra note 3, at 132.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 133.
22. Id.
23. 43 U.S.C. § 1605(a); see H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 2.
24. 43 U.S.C. § 1608(b).
25. Lazarus & West, supra note 3, at 133.
26. Comment, supra note 17, at 208; see T. BzoEnR, supra note 1, at 24.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 208-09.
29. H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 2-3.
No. 2]
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settlement logically followed. 30 This lack of supervision by the
Bureau, in turn, allowed the Natives to maintain, control, and
realize the benefits of their assets.31
The Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to divide the
state of Alaska into twelve geographic regions. Natives who
shared a common language, heritage and similar interests were
placed together. 32 The Natives within the designated regions then
established "regional corporations," which were organized for
profit and subject to the laws of Alaska.3 3 Once organized, the
corporation could issue 100 shares of stock to each Native
enrolled in the region.3 4 In addition, the Act provided for a
thirteenth corporation to be organized for the purpose of giving
stock interest to nonresident Alaskan Natives who wished to
enroll in a corporation 35; each Native born before December 18,
1971, could enroll in an appropriate regional corporation and
receive 100 shares of stock. 36 The Natives own their stock in the
corporation but are restricted from alienating it until December
18, 1991Y.3
Another provision of the ANCSA authorized the establish-
ment of village corporations.38 Any village that was made up of
25 or more Natives could elect to incorporate. 39 The village
could elect to incorporate for profit or nonprofit but once the
choice was made, it could not be changed.4 After formation,
the village corporations could issue 100 shares of stock to each
enrolled member born before December 18, 1971. 41 These cor-
porations were not subsidiaries of the regional corporations but
were subject to their control in certain areas.4z For example, the
regional corporation supervised the distribution of funds to the
village corporations for timber and mineral resources. 43 Also,
the regional corporations held the power to approve the articles
of incorporation enacted by the village corporation."
30. Lazarus & West, supra note 3, at 133.
31. Id. at 133-34.
32. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 1606(g).
35. Id. § 1606(c).
36. Id. § 1604(a).
37. Id. § 1606(h).
38. Id. § 1607.
39. Id. § 1607(a).
40. Id.





The capital for the corporations was distributed from the
Alaska Native Fund, in which the monetary settlement of the
ANCSA was deposited.45 Between 1972 and 1982, $462.5 million
was deposited into the fund.46 In addition, 2% royalty from the
revenues generated from the land taken by the federal and state
government funneled into the fund until a cap of $500 million
was reached.47 Pursuant to certain provisions of the Act, the
money in the Fund was divided at the close of each three months
of the fiscal year among the regional corporations based on the
number of Natives enrolled in the corporation.48 For the first
five years of the Act, a minimum of at least 10% was to be
distributed by the regional corporation to the stockholders. In
addition, 45% was to be given to the village corporations.4 9 At
the end of five years, the only distribution requirement was that
50% of the money received was to go to the village corpora-
tions.50
The Secretary of the Interior had withdrawn over 100 million
acres of land from which the village corporations collectively
held the right to withdraw 22 million acres.51 Upon selection,
the corporations received a fee simple to the surface of the
land.52 The Secretary then issued the regional corporation, for
the region in which the village lands were located, a patent to
the subsurface estate to the corresponding land. 3 The village
corporations were required to select the land within three years,
with the right to selection terminating on December 18, 1974.
54
The ANCSA allocated 16 million acres for withdrawal by
regional corporations.5 These corporations, in contrast to the
village corporations, obtained both the surface and subsurface
rights to the land.5 6 The Act required that the land be selected
within four years, ending on December 18, 1974.5 Upon selec-
tion of the land, the regional corporations received fee simple
title to their land and a fee simple patent to the subsurface lands
45. Id. § 1605(a).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 1605(c).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 1613(a), (b), (f), (h).
52. Id. § 1613(0.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1611(a).
55. Id. § 1611(c).
56. Id. § 1613(0.
57. Id. § 1611(c).
No. 2] NOTES
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selected by the village corporations 8 Although the land was
held by its respective corporations, specific provisions of the
ANCSA reduced the regional corporations' right to receive the
benefits from the property 9 Each year, 70% of the revenues
generated from the timber and subsurface resources of any one
regional corporation's land was required to be shared with the
other twelve regional corporations.60
The stated goal of the ANSCA was to maximize participation
by the Natives in decisions affecting their assets. 6' The ANCSA
gave the Natives control of their assets, thus freeing them from
the supervision of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 62 As a protective
measure, Congress imposed a twenty-year alienation restriction
on the stocks.0 Until December 18, 1991, the Native corpora-
tions were afforded time to build capital and establish themselves
as corporate entities.64 An additional restriction was that stock
could not be transferred except by inheritance, court decree, or
divorce. This restriction ensured that non-Natives would be
prevented from initiating a takeover during this period. A 1980
amendment produced another protection allowing corporations
to change their articles of incorporation to deny any non-Native
the right to vote. 6
Subsequent Problems
Several problems have resulted from the enactment of the
ANCSA. Although the settlement amounted to $962.5 million,
several of the village and regional corporations are presently
near bankruptcy because they are unable to maintain the ex-
penses associated with incorporation. 67 These expenses include
costs of incorporation, corporate elections, enrollments, stock
issuances, land conveyances, CPA audits, meetings, and public
reports. 68 The limited capital received from the Alaska Native
Fund during the eleven-year distribution period was divided
among the thirteen regional corporations. 69 Furthermore, where
58. Id. § 1613(0.
59. Lazarus & West, supra note 3, at i38.
60. 43 U.S.C. § 160601 .
61. rd. § 1602; see H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 3.
62. Lazarus & West, supra note 3, at 133.
63. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606(h), 1607(c).
64. Comment, supra note 17, at 209.
65. H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 3.
66. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h) (1980).
67. H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 4.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 4-5.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss2/9
village corporations were established within a region, an addi-
tional 45-50% payout from the regional corporation was re-
quired.70 Corporate expenses together with the limited amount
of money available to the corporation retarded the ability of
the Native corporation to make investments and solicit busi-
ness.71 The regional corporations that have realized a profit
attribute their heightened financial status to the existence of
exploitable resources and prime geographic location. 72 Although
a few of the regional corporations have shown a profit, the
majority of the regional corporations have met with only a
moderate amount of success, and there are several corporations
close to bankruptcy.7 3
Another serious problem has been created by the Bureau of
Land Management's failure to complete the forty-four million
acre distribution.74 By 1987 only nine million of the forty-four
million acres reached the Native corporations. 75 This delay in
land distribution has forced many corporations to resort to
expensive litigation, reducing their resources even further. 76
Motivated by the lack of success of many of the corporations,
Natives voiced their concerns about the future of the ANCSA.
These concerns, brought before Congress in 1987, included the
termination of the alienability restrictions in 1991.78 Termination
of the alienability restrictions presented a concern because of
the fear that after 1991 the Natives' stock shares would be lost
to non-Native control. 79 The stock is the Natives' personal stake
in the land. If non-Natives gained control of the land, Native
ownership would be lost.80
Since the purpose of the alienability restrictions in 1971 was
to give the Natives a period of time to establish themselves as
corporate entities, many Natives challenged termination in 1991
on grounds that the purpose of the restrictions had not yet been
fulffled 1 Many Natives who had been forced to accept a
70. Id.
71. Id. at 5.-
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id.
74. S. REP. No. 201, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 20, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CoDE CoNG.
& ADmI. NEws 3269, 3270 [hereinafter S. REp. No. 201].
75. Id.
76. Id.




81. H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 5.
No. 2] NOTES
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
398 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
corporate structure as the device for holding their interest in
1971 never became completely familiar with the nature and
practices of the corporate system.8" Before the ANCSA, the
Natives were primarily engaged in hunting and other outdoor
trades."3 It was the establishment of the ANCSA that sent the
Natives to compete with Wall Street.84 The twenty-year restric-
tion period was simply an insufficient amount of time for the
Natives to assimilate into the world of high finance.85
The 1987 Amendments to the ANCSA
The House of Representatives responded to the Natives' con-
cerns by enacting a bill proposing amendments to the ANCSA.8 6
The Senate similarly proposed a bill addressing these concerns.87
Subject to changes by House and Senate compromise, the House
of Representatives and the Senate approved the revised bill on
December 21, 1987, and enacted the 1987 amendments to the
ANCSA. 8 These amendments were passed to meet the concerns
of the Natives and to assist them in their struggle to preserve
their land. 9 Four amendments were added to section 1629 of
the existing act.9° The amendments were specifically targeted to
concerns about the alienability of shareholders' stock.91
82. Henry, Alaska Native Land Remains in Jeopardy, FournT WoRwD BUai,
September 1988, at 6. This publication, by the Fourth World Center for the Study of
Indigenous Law and Politics, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado
at Denver, is devoted to timely and current issues concerning indigenous peoples.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. S. REP. No. 201, supra note 74, at 21. The alienation concerns are the primary
focus of this note; however, there were several other concerns voiced by the Natives.
The possible bankruptcies of many of the regional and village corporations caused fear
that land would be lost to creditors' claims. Also, since only those Natives born before
December 18, 1971, received the stock, there was a concern the future generations of
Natives could receive an interest in the land only through inheritance. If the stock of
their ancestors was sold, these Natives would have no opportunity to participate in their
heritage. T. BEnE, supra note 1, at 99-110. The 1987 amendments, also discussed in
this note, have addressed and provided for these concerns.
86. 133 CONG. REc. H1669 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1987). H.R. 278 was proposed to
amend the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act providing Alaska Natives with options
for the continued ownership of lands and corporate shares received pursuant to the act.
H. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 1.
87. See 133 CoNr. REc. S15,396 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987).
88. Pub. L. No. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788 (1988) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1629
(1988)).
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The Procedural History of the Amendments
Since it was Congress and not the Natives who drafted, voted,
and passed these amendments, it is essential to examine Con-
gress' ideas and actions concerning the Alaskan Natives and
their land. The March 31, 1987, initial vote to pass the proposed
amendments appealed to the House of Representatives as a
measure directed at reducing some of the inadequacies of the
ANCSA. 92 These inadequacies were emphasized with regard to
the failure to the ANCSA to achieve its original goals. 93 The
goals of the ANCSA were to satisfy the economic, social, and
cultural needs of the Alaskan Natives by preserving land for the
Natives. 94 It is through the amendments that Congress intended
to restructure the ANCSA to meet these original goals. 95 Ex-
pression of the Natives' concerns about the protection of their
land initiated legislative involvement.96 It is with these concerns
that the legislature undertook to restructure the corporate guide-
lines of the ANCSA.w
The House bill extended the twenty-year alienation restriction
beyond the original date of December 18, 1991.98 To accom-
modate the desire of the Bristol Bay region, which wanted to
end the alienability restrictions, an exception canceled the res-
trictions as to Bristol Bay only.99 Other options available to the
corporations would be dissenters' rights and a trust option.'0°
Similarly, the Senate bill adopted the continuation of alien-
ability restrictions past December 18, 1991.101 In addition, the
Bristol Bay exception was also extended to include the Aleut
region.102 The Senate's bill contained more narrowly defined
92. See 133 CoNG. REC. H1669 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1987).
93. Id. (statement of Rep. Udall).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 5.
97. Id. Before the bill was brought before the House of Representatives, over two
years were spent in contemplation of the 1991 considerations. Hearings were also held
in Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Washington, D.C. The hearings were to provide the
House with input from the Natives as to the failure of the initial goals of the ANCSA.
Further, the Natives were given the chance to offer ideas of their own as to how the
goals of the ANCSA could be better achieved. H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 3.
98. See 133 CONG. Rec. H11,933 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987). The House explanatory
statement records the differences in the original bills of the House and the Senate. It
further details how the differences were reconciled to create the final bill passed by
both bodies of Congress on December 21, 1987.
99. Id. at H11,935.
100. Id. at H1I,936.
101. Id. at HII,935.
102. Id.
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guidelines for dissenters' rights and permitted the option of a
settlement trust.103
With these noted Senate changes, approved in a joint confer-
ence of members from both the House and Senate, a revised
bill was drafted and offered for consideration by Congress.114
On December 21, 1987, both the House and the Senate passed
the revised bill and enacted the 1987 amendments to the
ANCSA. 05
The Amendments
The amendments to section 1629 deal with the alienation of
Native corporate stock by making four changes to the existing
law.'06 First, procedures for considering amendments and reso-
lutions are established. °7 Second, the duration of alienability
restrictions are to extend past December 18, 1991.108 Third,
dissenters' rights and limitations are recognized.'0 Finally, an
option for a settlement trust is provided."0
The amendments begin with the general rule that the aliena-
bility restriction will continue after December 18, 1991, unless
a particular exception within the amendment applies or specific
action is taken by the corporation to end the restrictions."'
Essential to this section is the premise that regardless of any
corporation's choice to remove the restrictions, no restriction
on the alienation of stock can be removed prior to December
18, 1991, the original date provided in the ANCSA." 2
Although amended section 1629 imposes the general rule that
alienation restrictions continue after the original termination
date, there are several alternatives within the section which
provide for removal of the restrictions if the corporation so
chooses."' Subject to the guidelines detailed in the section, the
opt-out procedure allows alienation." 4 The guidelines provide
that before December 18, 1991, the proposal to terminate res-
103. Id. at H11,936-37.
104. Id. at H11,933; see also 133 CoNG. Rec. S18,698 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987).
105. 133 CONG. Rnc. H11,941 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987); 133 CoNo. Rac. S18,698
(daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987).
106. See 43 U.S.C. § 1629(b)-(e).
107. Id. § 1629b.
108. Id. § 1629c.
109. Id. § 1629d.
110. Id. § 1629e.
111. See id. § 1629c(a).
112. Id. 7




trictions can be considered only once.1"5 Further, if termination
is considered before December 18, 1991, put to a vote, and then
rejected, termination cannot again be considered for a specified
amount of time.116 The amount of time for reconsideration is
dependent upon the identity of the party who initiated the
proposal for termination. If the board of directors initiated the
consideration of the restriction removal then the failed amend-
ment cannot be reconsidered for five years. 17 Alternatively, if
the consideration was brought by a shareholders' petition, two
years must pass before the proposal can be reconsidered." 8 The
reconsideration limitations for failed proposals to remove the
alienation restrictions also apply to proposals initiated after
1991.Y9 The reconsideration limitations ensure that corporations
are not constantly threatened by directors or pressured by share-
holders to terminate the alienability restrictions.
20
Specific procedures for considering the removal of alienability
restrictions are included to ensure that every shareholder is
informed of the proposed actions. The basic procedure for
considering termination proposals requires that written notice
explaining the changes be sent or personally delivered to each
shareholder. 21 The notice of the suggested changes affords each
shareholder the opportunity to read through and review the
proposed action before the actual meeting. If a meeting to vote
on the restrictions is scheduled and is subsequently postponed
for more than forty-five days, the corporation is required to
again send notice to the shareholders detailing the proposed
changes."-a
For the shareholders to collectively petition the board of
directors to consider terminating the restrictions, signatures con-
stituting at least 25% of the total voting power of the corpo-
ration must be secured.- 3 A majority of the shareholders
possessing voting power is necessary to effect the status of the
alienability restrictions.- 4 Although a majority of the sharehold-
ers is necessary to effect the change, this same majority can
115. Id. § 1629c(b)(1)(A).
116. Id. § 1629c(b)(1)(B).
117. Id. § 1629c(b)(1)(B)(i).
118. Id. § 1629c(b)(1)(B)(il).
119. Id. § 1629c(b)(l)(QCi)-Ci).
120. Henry, supra note 82, at 6.
121. 43 U.S.C. § 1629b(b)(2)(A).
122. Id. § 1629b(b)(2)(C).
123. Id. § 1629b(c)(1)(A).
124. Id. § 1629b(d)(1)(A).
No. 2]
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elect to change the corporation's articles to require any per-
centage from the majority up to two-thirds voting power to
effect any future changes.'7 Further, a majority vote can amend
the articles of incorporation to include the issuance of a new
class of stock. 26 This new class of stock can be structured to
require a vote in a majority block to effect the removal of
alienability restrictions. 7 These procedures appear to reduce the
possibility that alienability restrictions will be terminated; how-
ever, shareholders and directors have the power to initiate ter-
minations proposals. 1'
Another provision of the amendments allows for a recapital-
ization plan.' 9 Before December 18, 1991, the Native corpora-
tion is given the opportunity to adopt a recapitalization plan,
by the majority of the stockholders with voting power or by the
higher number of votes required if the articles have been amended
to require such a vote.130 The chief purpose of a recapitalization
plan is to allow shareholders a chance to build capital in the
corporation without the threat of an outside takeover.' 3' There
are a number of options that the shareholder can choose in a
recapitalization plan. 32 These options include the extension of
alienability restrictions, the issuance of additional stock, and
plans for stock options as incentives to officers and employees
of the corporation. 33 These options are directed at extending
the time to decide on the future of the corporation without
threats of outside forces taking control.
34
The recapitalization plan, nevertheless, is subject to several
guidelines and restrictions. 35 For instance, if the recapitalization
plan is put to a vote and rejected, a waiting period of one year
is mandated before another plan for recapitalization can be
considered. 36 The Native corporation can elect to extend alien-
ability restrictions under its recapitalization plan but must state
125. Id. § 1629b(d)(1)(B).
126. Id. § 1629b(d)(2).
127. Id.
128. Henry, supra note 82, at 6.
129. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c).
130. Id. § 1629c(c)(1)(A).
131. 133 CoNG. REc. S18,698 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Mur-
kowski).
132. See 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c).
133. Id. § 1629c(c)(1)(B), 1629c(c)(I)(D), 1629c(3).
134. 133 CoNG. REc. S18,698 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Mur-
kowski).
135. See 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c).
136. Id. § 1629c(c)(1)(A).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss2/9
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an exact time that restrictions end. Unless a subsequent vote
approves the continuation of the restrictions, the alienation
restrictions are terminated on the arrival of the date desig-
nated.'17 An additional provision requires that the corporation
choose this option before December 18, 1991.138
For the corporations located within the Bristol Bay and Aleut
regions, a special opt-in procedure was available.' 39 However,
this procedure must have been adopted before February 3,
1989.' 40 For these corporations, alienation restrictions will end
on December 18, 1991, unless a direct action is taken by the
corporation to continue the restrictions.' 4' The premise that
restrictions will terminate unless a choice to extend is made is
qualified with the requirement that the shareholders vote at least
once prior to January 1, 1991, on the issue of whether or not
they wish to extend the alienability restrictions.' 42 Restrictions
may be extended for an indefinite period of time or for a
specified period of time not to exceed fifty years.' 43 In addition
to this provision, there is a provision that specifically states that
in the absence of such a vote prior to the 1991 date, the
restrictions do not terminate but instead remain in effect until
a couit orders such a vote.' 44 If the vote favors termination of
the restrictions, only then are the restrictions removed.
45
To summarize, the opt-in procedure appears to be very com-
plicated, and its premise states that alienability restrictions end
unless action is taken otherwise."' Action must be taken to a
certain degree regardless of the decision to terminate the res-
trictions because the shareholders must vote on the restrictions
before January 1, 1991.' 4 The major difference in this option
is that if teimination is approved by the voting power on or
before this date, the restrictions will terminate on December 18,
1991.148 Conversely, if the shareholders elect to extend the re-
striction, the Native corporation is subjected to provisions which
137. Id. § 1629c(c)(2)(A).
138. Id. § 1629c(c)(I)(A).
139. Id. § 1629c(d).
140. Id. § 1629c(d)(1)(A).
141. Id. § 1629c(d)(2)(A).
142. Id. § 1629c(d)(2)(B).
143. Id. § 1629c(d)(2)C)(i)-(i).
144. Id. § 1629c(d)(3)(B).
145. Id.
146. Id. § 1629c(d)(2)(B).
147. Id. § 1629c(d)(2)(A).
148. Id. § 1629c(d)(2)(A).
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require that the corporation wait the established period before
termination or a subsequent vote to terminate. 149 This procedure
looks to the fact that many of these corporations advocated
termination of the restrictions on the 1991 date. 50 And yet,
provisions are established to ensure that shareholders are able
to vote in the decision whether or not to extend alienability
restrictions that may be in the best interest of the corporation.
Another unique feature of the opt-in provision requires com-
pensation for any shareholder who voted to terminate alienability
restrictions and lost to a majority vote to extend.15' In the opt-
in procedure, dissenting shareholders have the right to demand
payment for their shares if the corporation should elect to
continue alienability restrictions.5 2 The section provides that the
corporation may pay the dissenter in cash or in alienable stock. 53
The third amendment focuses on the rights of dissenters. 5 4
As seen in the situation where a shareholder in the Bristol Bay
or Aleut corporations loses to a majority vote to extend alien-
ability restrictions, the opportunity to demand payment is al-
lowed. 55 Additionally, this section grants dissenters' rights to
opposing shareholders in the opt-out procedure.5 6 If a vote
results in the continuation of restrictions, any shareholder who
voted for the termination may present a demand for payment
of shares.157 The availability of a dissenter's claim is subject to
the limitation that the board of directors approve such pay-
ment. 58 1Even if the board of directors approves such a plan,
the dissenter's chances of receiving payment is further compli-
cated in that the board of directors is given the option to vote
for an extended period of time to make payment than is normally
allowed by Alaska state law. 5 9
The fourth and final amendment provides for the election of
a settlement trust. 60 Under this option, a Native corporation is
able to convey its assets to a settlement trust, limited to the
149. Id. § 1629c(d)(4)(A).
150. 133 CoNG. REc. S18,698 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Mur-
kowski).
151. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(d)(5)(A).
152. Id. Section 1629(d) covers dissenters' rights in general.
153. Id. § 1629c(d)(5)(B)i)-(ii).
154. Id. § 1629d.
155. Id. § 1629c(d)(5)(A).
156. Id. § 1629d(a)(1)(A).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 1629d(a)(2)(A).
I59. Id. § 1629d(b)(2).
160. Id. § 1629e.
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regulations provided by the state. 61 The purposes for establishing
such a trust include the promotion of health, education, and
welfare of the Natives. 62 The establishment of a trust is subject
to a number of restrictions, in addition to those dictated by the
state. 16 First, the shareholders must approve the creation of a
trust in the form of a resolution before assets will be conveyed
to the trust.'6 If the approval of the shareholders is not ob-
tained, the conveyance is void. 65 Second, subsurface estates
cannot be conveyed to a trust.'6 Third, the corporation cannot
convey its assets to the trust to avoid creditors.'6 And finally,
dissenters' rights must be observed if the rights of the benefi-
ciaries are inalienable.168
The Failure of the Amendments
to Meet the Natives' Concernas
The goal of the ANCSA was to meet the economic, social,
and cultural needs of the Alaskan Natives by preserving certain
land for the Natives.169 The failure of the ANCSA to meet this
goal prompted the 1987 amendments.170 The amendments were
aimed particularly at continuing and preserving Native ownership
of the settlement property.'7' Although the amendments appear
to address the Natives' concerns about preserving their land, we
will see that they contain provisions which serve to potentially
diminish the Natives' ability to control their land. In sum, these
amendments are unable to meet the goals of the ANCSA or the
needs of the Alaskan Natives.
Problems Within the Amendments
There are a number of problems in the amendments. The
amendments do provide for the alienation restrictions to con-
tinue past the original December 18, 1991, termination date. 72
However, the continuation provision is illusory, because there
161. Id. § 1629e(a)(1)(A).
162. Id. § 1629e(b)(1).
163. See generally id. § 1629e.
164. Id. § 1629e(a)(1)(B).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 1629e(a)(2).
167. See § 1629(e)(a)(3)(A).
168. Id. § 1629e(a)(3)(B).
169. H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 3.
170. Id. at 4.
171. Id.
172. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(a).
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are so many contrasting options available for termination. To
illustrate, a simple majority can vote to terminate the restrictions
even though there is a provision that they will continue to exist
after the termination date.17 1 If such vote favors termination,
the shareholders are then free to alienate their stock at any time
after December 18, 1991. 4 It is true that the simple majority
can be raised to two-thirds vote to effect a termination, but a
vote of the majority must have been secured at a time before
termination of alienability restrictions was considered. 7 5
The option available to the Bristol Bay and Aleut regions is
also problematic. If the Native corporations within these regions
elect to continue alienability restrictions, they are bound to
acknowledge and satisfy any dissenters' rights. 7 6 If a cash pay-
ment to the dissenter is made, there is a possibility that the
corporation's funds could be impaired, which could jeopardize
its financial status. It could conceivably follow that a vote to
terminate may be realized solely to meet these expenses.
The ability of a Native corporation to issue new types of
stock in a recapitalization plan is of concern. 77 As previously
noted, if a recapitalization plan is adopted by a Native corpo-
ration, additional options are then available to the corpora-
tion. 78 One such possibility is the issuance of new classes of
stock as incentives for employees and directors of the corpora-
tion.7 9 Although this issuance purports to retain Native partic-
ipation and control, different types of stock carry varying rights
to earnings and power to vote. 80 Therefore, there is a good
possibility that Native control will decrease with the election of
this type of option.
The intricacies of the settlement trust option also present
problems. First, dissenters' rights are available if the rights of
the beneficiaries of the trust are inalienable. 8" Second, the trust
is subject to any applicable state law, which could additionally
pose some problems. 82 Third, a corporation is not able to place
assets in trust to circumvent the need for corporate existence.'
173. Id. § 1629c(b)(1)(A).
174. Id.
175. Id. § 1629b(d)(1)(B); see also Henry, supra note 82, at 7.
176. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(d)(5)(A); Henry, supra note 82, at 7.
177. Henry, supra note 82, at 7.
178. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c).
179. Id. § 1629c(c)(3).
180. Henry, supra note 82, at 7.
181. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(a)(3)(B).
182. Id. § 1629e(a)(1)(A).
183. Id. § 1629e(a)(2).
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Because gubsurface rights to land are prohibited from being
placed in the trust, the regional corporation must continue its
existence in ordei to receive any of the profits it may derive.'1'
Thus, an additional problem is potentially created if expenses
involved in maintaining a corporation outweigh the profits re-
alized from the rights granted to the corporation. In such a
situation, with bankruptcy pending, the subsurface rights could
be lost altogether because the corporation would have to relin-
quish those rights to satisfy creditors claims.
Remaining Problems with the ANCSA
Aside from the complexities and problems within the amend-
ments, the Act itself contains a fundamental flaw that impedes
the Natives' ability to control their land. The reason for creating
the ANCSA was to give the Natives participation in decisions
affecting their rights and property. 85 Corporations do have the
potential to realize great profits and prosperity. However, edu-
cation and skill in dealing with the business world is essential
to achieving this type of success. 8 6 Non-Natives have generally
been raised in a society where stock reports and business trans-
actions are accepted as a way of life. Alaskan Native lifestyle,
however, centers around activities that are vastly different from
the business world. Assimilation into the corporate world is very
difficult for Natives who have previously had no contact with
such a world.'1 The twenty-year restriction period from entering
into the open market is not long enough for a Native shareholder
to understand the complexities and implications involved in
owning stock. 88 Forcing Natives to defend themselves within a
framework that they have not yet learned to understand is an
injustice even when the framework, in theory, was intended to
help them realize profits from their land.
The amendments afford the Natives the opportunity to main-
tan alienability restrictions. However, the impending bankruptcy
of many corporations makes selling stock a viable and attractive
option for the Natives.'8 9 For many, the decision whether to
preserve their land is burdened by inability to pay debts. 9' In
this situation, the sale of stock presents itself as an opportunity
184. Id. § 1629e(a)(2).
185. H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 3.
186. See Henry, supra note 82, at 6.
187. Id.
188. S. RP. No. 201, supra note 74, at 20.
189. T. BERcm, supra note 1, at 104-06.
190. Id.
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to satisfy indebtedness. The tension between the Native's cultural
values and immediate economic needs may force a decision to
be made solely as a means of survival.' 91
Conclusion
The 1987 amendments to the ANCSA provide an opportunity
for the Native corporations to extend the alienability restrictions
on shareholders' stock past December 18, 1991.'9 The amend-
ments were passed to preserve Native ownership of land. 193
Although appearing to accomplish this purpose, the amendments
contain options to terminate these restrictions, which frustrate
this goal. As a result, the 1987 amendments to the ANCSA are
no more able to meet the goal of preserving Native land own-
ership than were the original ANCSA provisions.
191. Id. at 106.
192. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(a).
193. See generally H.R. REP. No. 31, supra note 8, at 3. President Reagan signed
the 1987 amendments to the ANCSA, Pub. L. No. 100-241, on February 5, 1988.
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